Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and by Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

By Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

This booklet constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth foreign Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in ny, big apple, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.

The 15 revised complete papers provided have been rigorously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers collect novel paintings from such varied fields as laptop technological know-how, Operations study, man made Intelligence and dispensed platforms that concentrate on modeling, implementation and review of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent concepts over a various set of products. they're geared up in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and instruments.

Show description

Read Online or Download Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, PDF

Best management information systems books

Enterprise governance and enterprise engineering

Reaching firm good fortune necessitates addressing agencies in ways in which fit the complexity and dynamics of the trendy company atmosphere. even if, because the majority of company strategic projects seem to fail – between which these relating to details expertise – the presently usually practiced techniques to technique improvement and implementation look extra a disadvantage than an enabler for strategic firm luck.

Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,

This ebook constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in big apple, long island, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004. The 15 revised complete papers offered have been conscientiously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision.

Pragmatic Enterprise Architecture. Strategies to Transform Information Systems in the Era of Big Data

Pragmatic firm structure is a realistic hands-on handbook for firm architects. This e-book prepares you to higher interact IT, administration, and enterprise clients by means of equipping you with the instruments and information you want to deal with the most typical firm structure demanding situations. you'll come away with a realistic figuring out of and method of firm structure and actionable principles to remodel your business.

Additional resources for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,

Example text

Preference Formulation. In the case of a direct mechanism such as the VCG mechanism or our mechanism, the agents do not have additional computational load in formulating their preferences over all possible outcomes. This is because the agents transmit their observed signal θi to the centre and thus do not actually compute vi (K, θ) over all K ∈ K. Rather it is the centre which performs this calculation for each agent when solving the winner determination problem. Thus, our mechanism in this case does not add any computational load on the agents.

R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes, and N. R. Jennings. Computational mechanism design: A call to arms. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 18(6):4047, 2003. 6. P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu. Efficient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica, 69(5):123759, 2001. 7. V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002. 8. C. Mezzetti. Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Efficiency and full surplus extraction. Technical report, University of North Carolina, February 2003. 9. R. Mirrlees. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation.

This theme was continued by Parkes [14] and Ng et al. [13] in the context of strategyproof computing, in which the goal is to promote the deployment of strategyproof mechanisms within an open and shared infrastructure. The problem has often been identified in the context of simultaneous ascending price auctions, where it is termed the exposure problem [4]. Previous work to address the problem has considered two different directions. First, one can change the mechanism to define an expressive bidding language and incentivecompatibility.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.17 of 5 – based on 32 votes